This paper documents the existence of a significant forecast error on crude oil futures. We interpret it as a risk premium, which, in part, could have been explained by means of a real-time U.S. business cycle indicator, such as the degree of capacity utilization in manufacturing. This result is robust to the specification of the estimating equation and to the considered business cycle indicator. An out-of-the-sample prediction exercise reveals that futures adjusted to take into account this time-varying component produce significantly better forecasts than those of unadjusted futures, of futures adjusted for the average forecast error and of the random walk, particularly at horizons of more than 6 months.
Introduction
Although the dependency of global economic activity on crude oil has fallen steadily over the last thirty years, the oil price baseline assumption remains an important variable for all macroeconomic forecasts. For example, forecast of future oil prices are crucial in central bank's monetary policy decisions, because they enter the construction of expected in ‡ation and output-gap (Svensson, 2005) . The increase in oil prices since mid-2003 (Figure 1 ), which has surprised most analysts by its rapidity and intensity, prompts a new call to investigate the validity of the forecasting assumptions. A commonly used approach to forecast oil prices relies on futures contracts. The notion that the futures price is the optimal forecaster of the future spot price is a by-product of the expectations hypothesis, which assumes e¢ cient (and rational) …n a n c i a l markets. It implies that the futures price should be equal to the expected future spot price and, as a consequence, the forecast error should be zero on average (unbiasedness property of the forecaster) and uncorrelated with any variable in the information set at the time the forecast is made.
However, there is a large and growing literature on …n a n c i a l markets (see e.g. Cochrane, 2005 , for a survey) that has challenged the expectations hypothesis. In principle, market participants could be not rational or have a rational learning behavior. More importantly for the purpose of this paper, rejection of forecast unbiasedness could mean that, even if expectations are rational, futures prices contain a not negligible and possibly time-varying risk premium component. For instance, a number of studies (e.g. Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005) show that excess returns on US treasuries are high in recessions and low in booms. In this paper we argue that excess returns on oil futures may be the outcome of time-varying risk premia, too.
Building on a methodology introduced by Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) to explain the excess return on federal funds futures, we show that the expectations hypothesis fails also for oil futures and that there is a systematic forecast error, interpretable as the negative of the risk premium. 1 The latter is on average positive and, because of the sensitivity of oil prices to the US business cycle, predictable by proxies of macroeconomic conditions, such as the level of capacity utilization in manufacturing. 2 Besides its widespread use as an indicator of the state of the business cycle, the degree of capacity utilization is known for its high complementarity with energy consumption, as emphasized by Finn (2000) in a study on the e¤ect of energy price increases on economic activity. Our …n d i n g s are robust to the speci…cation used to estimate the sensitivity of oil prices to the business cycle and to the choice of indicators of macroeconomic or oil market conditions.
We assess the forecasting performance of our approach on the basis of an out-of-the-sample prediction exercise. Results show that forecasts adjusted to take into account the time-varying risk premium (that we dub "risk-adjusted forecasts") display lower mean and root-mean squared errors than those of the unadjusted futures, of the futures adjusted for the average forecast error ("constant-adjusted") and of the random walk hypothesis, particularly at horizons of over 6 months.
We are not the …r s t to have found that futures may yield biased forecast of oil prices. In the framework of the marginal convenience yield, on the basis of estimates of the oil risk-adjusted discount rate, Pindyck (2001) calculates that the 6-month futures contract should under-predict the realized spot price by around 3 to 4.5 per cent. Erb and Harvey (2006) and Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) provide evidence of the relationship between futures and risk premium. The latter work shows that commodity futures risk premium has been equal in size to the historical risk premium of stocks (the equity premium) and has exceeded the risk premium of bonds. 3 These works concentrate on the average risk premium, neglecting its time-variability. On the contrary, Moosa and Al-Lougani (1994), focusing on the properties of oil spot and futures prices in the context of co-integration, …n d that there is a time-varying risk premium that can be adequately modelled by a GARCH process. Consistent with this result, Considine and Larson (2001) suggest that crude oil assets contain a risk premium that rises sharply with higher price volatility. Other works relate the risk premium variation to macroeconomic factors. Bailey and Chan (1993) (Fama and French, 1988) , are informative about commodity futures risk premia. Consistently with this approach, this paper directly relates the risk premium to the current state of macroeconomic conditions and systematically analyzes the implications for the futures forecasting properties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section we document the size of the ex post forecast errors on oil futures, showing that 3 There are also studies on the e¢ ciency of the oil futures market and on the forecasting properties of the futures that reached opposite conclusions. For example, Chinn et al. these display a non trivial cyclical component. In Section 3 we perform several robustness exercises both on the speci…cation and of the business cycle indicators considered. In Section 4 we propose a method to adjust the forecast based on oil futures and evaluate its performance with respect to the unadjusted futures and other alternatives. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
Risk premia on crude oil futures
This paper focuses on the question whether f (n) t -the price at time t of a futures on an oil barrel for delivery n periods ahead -is the best predictor of the oil spot price realized at t + n (denoted p t+n ).
Neglecting marking-to-market considerations, a long position on oil futures has no initial cost and a random payo¤ of f (n) t p t+n . Standard no-arbitrage condition requires that
where m t+n is the stochastic pricing kernel and t subscripts throughout denote conditioning on the information set at time t. Rearranging gives
which says that f (n) t equals the expectation for the future realized valuethe …r s t term on the right hand side of (2) -minus the risk premium (the second term).
Our approach in this paper is a purely statistical one, using the standard tools of forecast evaluation. Since the main goal of the paper is to provide a method to forecast oil prices, we just check whether using futures prices as predictor of subsequent oil prices produces systematic errors. If futures are unbiased expectations of future prices, then the forecast errors must have mean zero and must be uncorrelated with any variable in the information set at the time that the forecast was made.
In the remaining of this section we …r s t estimate the mean of the ex-post realized forecast error, i.e. the average of
and test whether this is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. We interpret a non-zero average as a risk premium, which is the negative of the forecast error. We then test whether the risk premium contains a component that varies over time. If there is a signi…cant, possibly time-varying, risk premium, futures-based forecasts of oil prices should be opportunely adjusted.
Bias
In the following analysis we use oil price futures on the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) grade. They trade on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and are settled each month. The contract provides for the physical delivery of 1,000 barrels of oil at any point during the settlement month. We use monthly data for a sample period of over 17 years, from January 1990 to February 2007, for which futures data are available at all maturities from 2 to 12 months. 4 We neglect futures prices at 1-month maturity as they are almost always indistinguishable from the corresponding spot prices. As is apparent in Figure 1 the sample is long enough to display periods of relative price stability, periods of sharp price decreases and periods of prolonged price increases.
We …r s t estimate the average forecast error and test whether it is statistically di¤erent from zero, that is we test if there is a non-zero risk premium.
To test whether futures are unbiased predictors of subsequently realized oil prices we run, for each horizon n, the following regression:
where is a constant measuring the average ex post realized forecast error and " is an error term.
To compute the dependent variable we take the simple average of futures daily quotations during the third week of each month t: The choice is suggested to avoid possible daily outliers. The week selected is the third because, as it will be clear below, it is the closest to the release of relevant 4 Correspondingly, the last spot price considered for constructing the forecast errors ( fe t+n ) is dated February 2008. 5 We also computed standard errors using the heteroskedasticity-and autocorrelationconsistent procedure from Hodrick (1992) , allowing for n 1 lags of excess returns to be serially correlated due to contract overlap, and obtained almost identical results.
business-cycle indicators. However, all the results also hold true if we sample the data on a particular day (the 15 th ) of each month. Given that futures contract overlap induces autocorrelation, we compute standard errors using Newey-West autocorrelation-and heteroskedasticityconsistent (HAC) standard errors, with a lag truncation parameter equal to 2(n 1), and throughout the paper we always report t statistics based on those standard errors. 
Capacity utilization
Up to this point we have documented the presence of a signi…cant forecast error in oil price futures. To investigate whether business cycle phases help explaining realized futures-based forecast errors, we run the following regression:
where UCap is the degree of capacity utilization in US manufacturing, which is a proxy of the US business cycle. We focus on the US since it is the largest world oil consumer. Furthermore, we want to use data known to market participants at the time future contacts are subscribed, that is in month t. Since business cycle indicators are subject to several backward revisions, we rely on real-time series. Given that US capacity utilization values are released by the Federal Reserve around the 15 th day of each month for the previous month, we date our UCap variable as t 1.
6 Table 2 reports the results. Risk premia (the negative of forecast errors) and capacity utilization are negatively related. The absolute value of the slope coe¢ cient increases with the maturity of the contract and is statistically signi…cant, at 5 per cent or lower level, from the 4-month horizon on. 7 The HAC t statistics we report may still be plagued by small-sample distributional properties. To tackle this problem, we do a bootstrap following Horowitz (2004): we resample observations with replacement to generate 50,000 synthetic samples of the same size as the original data set. To account for possible serial dependence of the data generating process, we resample the data in blocks, with block size equal to n + 1 for each horizon n. 8 The bootstrap p values, reported in square brackets in table 2, are computed using 6 See the appendix for further details. 7 We also run predictability regressions including the own futures f (n) t , but results remain unchanged. When we run regression (5) using the last available revised vintage of the degree of capacity utilization point estimates of the slope coe¢ cients are still positive, yet slightly smaller. 8 To this end we adapted a routine by Eric Swanson, whose cooperation is gratefully acknowledged. In choosing the block lengths there is a tradeo¤: bigger block lengths reproduce the serial correlation better, but e¤ectively reduce the number of independent draws from the sample, reducing sampling variation. We have tried to choose reasonable block lengths that capture as much serial correlation as possible without reducing the number of independent bootstrap draws too much. Results are not particularly a¤ected if we change the block lengths.
the distribution of synthetically generated t statistics centered at the actual t statistic. Results support the choice of the degree of capacity utilization in manufacturing as predictor of realized excess-returns on oil futures.
According to the R 2 the percentage of the variance of the forecast error on oil futures explained by this speci…cation is not trivial, especially at longer horizons. For instance, the model with capacity utilization explains almost 20 per cent of the forecast error on oil futures contract with 12-month maturity. One may argue that, especially for the longer-horizon forecasts, the forecast errors are bound to be quite persistent. Since the predictors are also persistent, this may give rise to a problem of near spurious regressions. 9 To check whether this is the case with our regressions, we calculate the percentages of bootstrapped R 2 values exceeding the actual ones. Results, reported in curly brackets, show that actual R 2 values are not unusually large compared with bootstrapped ones, as they remain below or close to the median.
In sum, the results in table 2 suggest that the adjustment to be made over the futures should be smaller during booms and higher during slacks: that is, to obtain risk-adjusted forecasts we should add to the futures a countercyclical term.
This time-varying risk premium arises from varying conditional covariance of the asset return with the pricing kernel (see equation (2)). What is the intuition? Cochrane (2001) , referring to the evidence that long-run excess returns are quite predictable and that most of the variables forecasting excess returns are correlated with or forecast business cycles, suggests a natural explanation emphasized in Fama and French (1989) : expected returns vary over business cycles. It takes a higher risk premium to hold risky assets at the bottom of a recession. Why? It is plausible that risk or risk adversion vary over the business cycle -for instance, it happens when the utility function of investors displays habit formation -and this is exactly the horizon at which we see predictable excess returns.
Further, as recently emphasized also by Gorton et al. (2007) there may be a link between risk premia and inventories. The level of inventories matters because, as in Deaton and Laroque (1992), future spot price variance is negatively related to the level of inventories. That is, when inventories are low, the bu¤er function of inventories to absorb shocks is diminished. In these circumstances, the risk of a stock-out increases which raises the volatility of the future spot price. Because commodity futures are used to insure price risk, inventory theory predicts an increase in the risk premium. Since inventories are relatively low during recessions (e.g. Fama and French, 1988) , in turn, this produces a counter-cyclical risk premium.
In the next section we directly analyze the relationship between excess returns on oil futures and the level of inventories.
Inventories
Consistent with Gorton et al. (2007) , we use inventories directly as explanatory variables for risk premia. Since we collect oil spot and futures prices as of the third week of each month, we select the level of US oil inventories as of the second week of each month to avoid endogeneity problems. We then estimate
and …n d that
That is, we do …n d that the expost forecast error is positively correlated with the level of inventories or, alternatively, that the realized risk premium is negatively correlated with the level of inventories.
However, when we also add as explanatory variable our preferred business cycle indicator (the degree of capacity utilization) the level of inventories is no longer signi…cant on most horizons, while the sign, the size and the significance of capacity utilization remains almost intact (table 3, panel B). This result indicates that the information content of the level of US oil inventories is spanned by the business cycle indicator that we have already considered in Section 2.2.
Overall we interpret these …n d i n g s as suggestive that oil futures risk premia co-vary with the level of inventories and across the business cycle. Indeed, as suggested by Gorton et al. (2007) , problems related to the availability and the poor quality of inventory data, and issues regarding the appropriate de…-nition of relevant inventories, may imply that business cycle indicators could be viewed as a better proxy for scarcity.
Still, as mentioned before, it is well plausible that the relevant explanation for the time variation of risk premia lies with the variability of risk or risk adversion over the business cycle. Identifying the exact nature of this correlation is beyond the scope of the current paper, which focuses on improving on the forecasting performance of oil futures. Yet, in the next section we provide several sensitivity exercises on the time-varying pattern of oil future risk premia. 
Robustness analysis
To gauge the sensitivity of the results obtained in the previous section we perform several alternative estimations, changing either the speci…cation of the estimating equation or the explanatory variable. First, we provide further evidence for a predictive relationship using one-month holding period returns on a futures contract as the dependent variable instead of futures forecast errors. Second, we show that a business cycle indicator is relevant even in the framework of the so-called "price spread" speci…cation (see e.g. 
One-month holding period returns
An alternative way to increase the number of independent observations in our regressions and check the robustness of our results is to consider the excess returns an investor would realize from holding an n month ahead oil futures contract for just one month -by purchasing the contract and then selling it back as an (n 1) month ahead contract in one month's time -rather than holding the contract all the way through to maturity. As suggested by Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) , by considering one-month holding period returns we reduce potential problems of serial correlation and sample size for the longer-horizon contracts, and give ourselves more than 200 completely independent windows of data (under the null hypothesis of no predictability of the risk premium) for all contracts. We thus consider regressions of the form
where f (n) t denotes the n month-ahead average contract price on the third week of month t, f (n 1) t+1 denotes the (n 1) month-ahead contract price on the third week of month t + 1, and the di¤erence between these two prices is the ex post realized one-month holding period return on the n month-ahead contract. Using speci…cation (7), the residuals are serially uncorrelated under the null hypothesis of no predictability of excess returns, because all variables in equation (7) are in …n a n c i a l markets'information set by the beginning of the next period.
Results, presented in table 4, show that the degree of capacity utilization is a signi…cant predictor of such excess returns. As expected from quasidi¤erencing of the left-hand-side variable R 2 values are uniformly quite small.
Price spread speci…cation
Previous studies on the forecasting ability of oil futures have applied the price-spread speci…cation, also known as the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression (Mincer and Zarnowitz, 1969) . This is a regression of the change of spot augmenting it with the variable intended to capture the time-varying risk premium, Speci…cally we run
Results are reported in table 5. The degree capacity utilization is highly signi…cant in explaining subsequent realized oil price changes. Such coe¢ cients are negative and have absolute values increasing with the horizon. The negative sign implies that when capacity utilization is low oil prices are predicted to increase, while when capacity utilization is high oil prices are expected to decrease. This result also means that even with a more "classical" price-spread speci…ca-tion, the state of the business-cycle is informative on oil price developments. Overall, we interpret this evidence as highly supportive of the previous results.
prices (p t+n p t ) on the di¤erence between the futures and current spot price (also known as "basis", f 
Other business cycle indicators
To check the sensitivity of the results to the explanatory variable in regression (5) we use alternative business cycle indicators. In particular, we try to capture the cyclical variability of the oil futures risk premium using the bond yield curve in the US or a world leading indicator produced by the OECD.
Among leading indicators the bond yield curve is often used as a predictor of excess returns in the Treasury markets. We select three di¤erent term spreads based on the di¤erence between 1, 2, 5 and 10 year constant maturity Treasury yields (annualized). As is evident in table 6 oil futures risk premia are signi…cantly correlated with those spreads, with the sign of estimated coe¢ cients always consistent across the di¤erent horizons. R 2 values range from 4 to 15 per cent.
Another possible driving factor of the forecast error of oil futures could be related to the oil demand originating not only from the US, but also from other areas, especially from some developing countries. In order to capture the cyclical conditions in the whole world, we use an indicator of global economic activity the composite leading indicator (CLI) constructed by the OECD for the aggregate of the member economies and the six major non-member economies (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa). 10 Results in table 7 show that the coe¢ cients of the composite leading indicator are positive and statistically signi…cant, especially at horizons larger than 5-month. R 2 values are uniformly lower than those obtained using the US degree of capacity utilization, reaching a maximum of 10 per cent per cent at n = 12. Interestingly, the statistical signi…cance of the latter indicator of global demand disappears when the degree of capacity utilization in the US manufacturing is included simultaneously in the regression. 11 
Contango vs. backwardation
One may then ask whether the relationship between risk premia and the business cycle is non-linear: in fact, low inventory levels for a commodity are associated with an inverted ("backwardated") term structure of futures prices, while high levels of inventories are associated with an upward sloping futures curve ("contango").
We test whether our estimates are a¤ected on the status of the oil market, that is we consider the possibility that risk premia may behave di¤erently when the market is commonly described as in backwardation or as in contango. To this end we construct a contango dummy (D c ), equal to one whenever f (6) t > p t , that is when the futures price with maturity 6 months is larger than the current spot price, and zero otherwise. In our sample it happens 72 times, representing 43 per cent of the total.
We estimate the following equation
t+n . (9) Results, reported in table 8, show that the contango dummy is never signi…cant, neither by itself nor interacted with the capacity utilization. This 10 We use the "ratio to trend"series. It refers to the deviation from the long-term trend of the series and focuses on the cyclical behavior of the indicator. 11 In a previous working paper version we also report results with the year-on-year growth in US non-farm payrolls, whose data are also available in real time. Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) use such a variable as their preferred business cycle indicator to predict excess returns on the federal funds futures. Results are broadly consistent, even if estimated coe¢ cients of employment growth display larger standard errors than those of capacity utilization.
means that both the constants and the slopes estimated at any horizon are stable across states of the oil market.
We can thus turn to evaluating the forecasting performance of our model. 
Predictability of oil prices in real time
Having documented the presence of a signi…cant and time-varying risk premium on oil futures, in this section we evaluate the forecast of oil prices (p t+n ) comparing four alternative methodologies:
1. random walk, which impliesp t+n = p t ;
2. unadjusted futures:
3. constant-adjusted futures, based on regression (4):
4. risk-adjusted futures, based on regression (5):
A …r s t assessment of the forecasting performance of these di¤erent methodologies can be obtained by looking at …g u r e 2. It shows forecasts of oil prices in two illustrative months, January 1997 and September 2003. In January 1997 (upper panel) the oil spot price was around $26 and, according to futures, oil prices were expected to decline to just over $20 by the following January. Demand was very high and capacity utilization in manufacturing Note: US dollars per barrel. Risk-adjusted forecasts are computed using estimated coe¢ cients as in table 2. Constant-adjusted forecasts are computed from the estimated coe¢ cient as in table 1.
was running well above the historical average, at almost 83 per cent. The riskadjusted procedure predicts that the risk premium required over the futures would have been very low. In fact, risk-adjusted futures were virtually indistinguishable from unadjusted futures. By contrast, the constant-adjusted forecast would have signaled roughly constant prices. Indeed, by January 1998 the oil price declined, to $16.3.
In the Summer of 2003 (…gure 2, lower panel) oil prices were stable at around $30. In September of that year futures pointed to a decline in oil price to just below $26 in the following 12 months. The recovery out of the recession in 2001 was not yet …r m l y established, the capacity utilization index was still relatively low, at around 73 per cent, and the risk premium was correspondingly sizeable. In fact, the risk-adjusted forecast would have signaled an oil price as high as more than $38 by September 2004. Note that not taking into account the cyclical factor -as the constant-adjusted forecast does -would have yielded just slightly increasing oil prices. Indeed oil prices did rise and at the end of the horizon were at around $47. In order to perform a more formal comparison of the forecasting ability of the di¤erent methodologies we run a set of rolling "out-of-sample" regressions. First of all we calculate rolling-endpoint (or expanding window) real-time forecasts, initializing our estimates by using the …r s t 30 observations. We then compute one-step-ahead forecasts for each maturity of the futures in our sample.
To gauge a quantitative measure of how di¤erent these four forecasting methodologies are, in table 9, panel (A) we report some summary statistics on forecast errors, namely the mean error -de…ned as the di¤erence between the realized and the forecast price (p t+n p t+n ) -and the root mean squared error of the forecast. The mean error of the risk-adjusted forecast is the lowest one, both at short and long horizons. For instance at the 6-month horizon the mean error of risk-adjusted futures is around 60 cents, compared with $1 for the constant-adjusted, $1.55 for the random walk and $2 for the unadjusted futures. At the 12-month horizon the mean forecast error committed by the risk-adjusted futures is $2.78, compared with $3.85 for the constant-adjusted futures, $4 for the random walk, and more than $5 for the unadjusted futures. A similar conclusion can be drawn on the basis of root mean squared errors, which for the risk-adjusted forecast are always below those implied by the other three forecasting techniques considered. In particular, at the 12-month horizon risk-adjusted forecast mean squared errors are 10 per cent below the constant adjusted, 17 per cent below the random walk and 19 per cent below the unadjusted futures. Interestingly, the random walk assumption seems to produce better forecasts than the unadjusted futures, in terms of To evaluate whether forecast obtained with the risk-adjusted futures are also statistically signi…cantly more accurate than those produced by the other three methodologies we …r s t repeat the above calculations on a moving (rolling) window of 30 observations, which corresponds to roughly one sixth of the sample. We then perform a battery of tests. Details of mean and root mean squared statistics of the four forecasting methodologies are reported in table 9, panel (B). First of all one must notice that mean errors of risk-adjusted futures are very low, never larger than 13 cents. Mean errors of constant-adjusted futures are negative at short horizons -i.e. adjusting futures for constant risk premia tends to over-predict oil prices up to n = 6 -and positive at longer ones. In absolute terms they are relatively low, yet larger than those obtained by adjusting futures for time-varying risk premia. In terms of root mean squared errors the gains obtained with risk-adjusted futures are similar to those derived with the expanding window.
In table 10 we present results of the unconditional test of predictive ability proposed by Giacomini and White (2006) . 12 It asks which forecast was more accurate, on average, in the past; it may thus be appropriate for making recommendations about which forecast may be better for an unspeci…ed future date. With respect to the classical Diebold and Mariano (1995) statistic, this unconditional test of predictive ability provides primitive conditions that ensure its validity and extends it to an environment permitting parameter estimation. It turns out that risk-adjusted forecasts are more accurate -at the 5 per cent or lower level -than those of the unadjusted futures 12 Viewing the di¤erence in forecast performance (e.g., squared prediction error) as the dependent variable in a regression containing only a constant, it is like a test for whether the regression intercept is zero at all horizons larger than 6-month. The risk-adjusted method outperforms the random walk at all horizons larger than 8-month. With respect to the constant-adjusted futures the evidence is weaker, as risk-adjusted futures are more accurate at all horizon larger than 6-month, but only at the 10 per cent level.
To further investigate on the relative performance of constant-adjusted and risk-adjusted forecast we also run an encompassing test. In fact, since the model with the constant-adjusted futures can be viewed as a particular case (with = 0) of the model including also the utilized capacity, in table 11 we compare root mean squared errors produced by the two nested models 13 Since all the forecasts under consideration are one-step-ahead, the critical values reported in Clark and McCracken (2001) can be safely applied. According to the test of equal accuracy of prediction, risk-adjusted forecasts are more accurate than the constant-adjusted counterparts from n = 3 on at the 1 per cent level. Furthermore, the ENC-F statistics indicate that from the 3 month horizon the degree of capacity utilization has predictive content for the futures-based forecast errors.
Concluding remarks
This paper documents that crude oil futures display a signi…cant ex post forecast error, which is negative on average. We also show that this forecast error has a non trivial cyclical component which can be, in part, explained by means of real-time US business cycle indicators, such as the degree of n is the forecasting horizon. MSE-F is the value of the equal accuracy of forecasts: the null hypothesis is that the root mean squared errors of the two models are equal. ENC-F is the value of the test statistic for encompassing of forecasts: under the null the forecasts of the constant-adjusted futures encompass that of the risk-adjusted; denotes signi…cance at 10 per cent; denotes significance at 5 per cent; denotes signi…cance at 1 per cent. Forecast errors are derived from moving window (30 monthly observations) estimates of each model. utilized capacity in manufacturing. Results appear robust to various checks such as the use of alternative speci…cations of the estimating equation and the consideration of di¤erent business cycle indicators.
Adjusting the oil price forecast embedded into futures to take account of this time-varying risk premium yields "risk-adjusted" forecasts which perform extremely well in periods both of "bear" and of "bull" oil markets. More formally, with an out-of-the-sample prediction exercise we show that the forecast adjusted for a time-varying risk premium -linked to the US business cycle -performs signi…cantly better than the unadjusted futures, the simple constant-adjusted futures and the random walk, particularly at horizons longer than 6 months.
If the forecast error could have been signi…cantly reduced by investors exploiting available information on the US business cycle, as we have shown, the question that naturally arises is why they did not do so. A thorough analysis of such issue is beyond the scope of the current work and is left for future research. Yet, an inspection of net long positions, reported by the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission, held by non-commercial traders, usually referred to as "speculators", reveals that both in 1999-2000 and in late 2003 these positions were largely positive, signaling expectations of rising oil prices, which e¤ectively were realized in the following months.
14 Therefore, it is possible that this category of market participants was aware of this risk premium and provided an insurance to (hedging) commercial market participants. This notwithstanding, a signi…cant part of the premium was not competed away. A possible explanation is that non-commercial traders represent a small percentage (just a little over 10 per cent) of all open interest, since they trade mainly in over-the-counter markets. Alternatively, as suggested by Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) in the context of futures on federal funds, the futures market may not be perfectly competitive or noncommercial traders may themselves be risk adverse.
As a …n a l remark we note that our results have crucial implications for policy analysis and economic modelling. First, they point out that futures should be appropriately adjusted for predicting oil prices which, in turn, a¤ect in ‡ation and output gap forecasts, the two variables that, according to modern economic theory, are crucial for monetary policy decisions. Sec-Composite leading indicator: OECD (http://www.oecd.org/document/34 /0,3343,en_2649_34349_38368994_1_1_1_1,00.html)
Oil inventories: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration (www.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_wstk_dcu_nus_w.htm).
